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4In 2010, SDC published a Project 
Cycle Management (PCM) handbook 
for preparing, implementing and 
evaluating financial sector develop-
ment projects: A Manual on Manag-
ing Cooperation in Financial Sector 
Development1. This paper provides 
complementary information specific 
to projects dealing with agricultural 
and catastrophe insurance (thereafter 
referred to as “ACI”). It aims to pro-
vide high-level guidance on designing 
or assessing ACI projects and includes 
a section on monitoring, too.
1 The manual is accessible under www.sdc-employment-
income.ch/en/Home/Financial_Sector/FSD_PCM_Manual
The paper has highly benefited  
from representatives from Allianz Re,  
GiZ, KfW, MiCRO Insurance  
Catastrophe Risk Organisation, 
Microinsurance Centre, PlaNet 
Guarantee, SDC, SECO, Syngenta 
Foundation for Sustainable  
Agriculture, Swiss Re, University 
of St. Gallen, the World Food Pro-
gramme, and Richard Carpenter 
(consultant) who participated in a 
SDC organised agricultural & catas-
trophe insurance expert meeting on 
12. 9. 2013. 
1 Introduction
5Project Preparation or, if a project is proposed to the public funder, Project Assessment, is 
a key phase that leads to the decision on whether or not to support a specific project. It is 
also during this phase that indicators for success and impact on the target population have 
to be agreed upon.
2.1 ACI background information
When preparing or assessing an insurance project 
targeting the low-income population, three key 
characteristics should be kept in mind:
1.  Insurance is a risk management tool – it is a means 
to an end only and not a goal in itself. What ul-
timately counts are the direct and indirect effects 
resulting from being insured. However, these ef-
fects	are	often	difficult	to	assess	properly.
  Implication: a clear result chain and plausible 
hypotheses on outcome and impact are required 
in order to set up a meaningful monitoring and 
evaluation framework, at least for larger projects.
2.  There is little spontaneous demand for insurance 
products in the low-income population segment. 
The reasons are many, including non-familiarity 
with the concept of insurance, low levels of trust in 
insurance companies and other spending priorities.
  Implication: ACI products have to demonstrate 
high customer value in order to generate de-
mand and projects may have to put substantial 
efforts	 into	financial	 literacy	 campaigns,	 educa-
tional marketing or similar activities to raise the 
awareness and understanding of insurance and 
to	develop	an	appreciation	of	the	benefits	of	in-
surance. Alternatively, insurance is often bundled 
with a service clients have a natural demand for: 
such as credit, farm inputs, building materials 
etc., which may help to reach larger numbers of 
people quickly, but does not exempt project part-
ners from the need to educate clients about ACI.
3.  Insurance is an intangible service and direct ben-
efits	can	only	be	measured	in	the	event	of	a	loss.	
While it is relatively straightforward to calculate 
the	financial	 value	of	 having	bought	 insurance	
after a loss has occurred and a claim has been 
made,	the	indirect	benefits	of	having	insurance	
are	more	difficult	to	assess.	Indirect	benefits	may	
stem from i) peace of mind of the insured and 
flowing	 from	this	a	better	planning	horizon;	 ii)	
access to services which would otherwise not be 
accessible	(e.g.	farm	credit);	iii)	facilitation	of	in-
creased business investments, resulting in higher 
net income.
  Implication: if ACI projects are promoted on the 
grounds of supporting poverty reduction efforts, 
great care has to be taken in establishing clear 
result chains and identifying suitable indicators. 
Defining	result	chains	and	measurable	indicators	
of success is not always straight forward in the 
field	of	ACI.	Linking	results	to	project	inputs	is	per	
se already challenging. However, when dealing 
with ACI, establishing these relationships often 
becomes very challenging. Part of the complex-
ity is the interplay of many different stakehold-
ers, such as regulators, public administration at 
national, regional and local level, farm extension 
services, lending institutions, community-based 
organisations, etc. Insurance is in most cases not 
the most binding constraint to development and 
hence progress depends on other types of inter-
ventions, too.
 Pilot tests: agricultural and catastrophe insurance 
often include substantial degrees of innovation and 
research components: client needs and country 
contexts are different, some approaches prove to 
be unsustainable and technological advances open 
up new opportunities. One clear consequence of 
this is the need for pilot tests where new technolo-
gies or approaches are involved. Pilot tests aim at 
validating an approach in a controlled environment 
without impacting a whole market or spending 
money on activities that directly depend on the 
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6success of the innovation being tested2. Setting up 
pilot tests require great care to ensure they are well 
designed, do not ignore critical matters or try to 
achieve too much. Only then will they be able to 
prove something useful.
 Emerging insights: one emerging insight from 
both agricultural and catastrophe insurance is that 
offering these insurance services solely to individu-
als3	is	unlikely	to	produce	sufficient	demand	to	sus-
tain business on a commercial basis. It is only when 
embedded into a broader risk management and 
development strategy that ACI services are able to 
show their full potential. A second insight is that pi-
lot projects, which try to innovate at too many fron-
tiers, almost invariably fail, especially if distribution 
options are limited. Finally, the timeframe required 
to develop, introduce and reach scale is typically at 
least	five	years	 for	 sustainable	ACI	projects.	Much	
depends on (i) the existence and capacity of ag-
gregators that can reach the target groups, (ii) the 
quality of the legal and regulatory framework and 
the general business environment and (iii) the avail-
ability of quality data to support the development of 
valuable insurance contracts.
2.2 Context Assessment
2.2.1 Rational for supporting ACI 
projects – development objectives
For governments and public funders, there are two 
main objectives for supporting ACI projects: (1) 
generation of income and employment through 
increasing agricultural productivity – partly through 
facilitated access to agricultural loans – and sub-
sequently	developing	rural/agricultural	markets;	(2)	
social protection (or humanitarian aid) by ensur-
ing the basic livelihood of low-income populations 
hit by natural disasters. In the latter case, ACI may 
represent	 an	 effective	 and	 efficient	 alternative	 to	
traditional disaster relief approaches, or at least 
complement them. These two goals often go hand 
in hand: better risk management options should al-
low local communities to strengthen their resilience 
against natural disasters. This helps them to better 
secure their livelihoods and may eventually trans-
late into increased investments and more produc-
tive activities, thus contributing to poverty reduc-
tion. Nevertheless, the primary objective of each 
project	will	inform	its	specific	design	and	influence	
target setting and outcome monitoring.
ACI projects can approach the topic of risk and rural 
development from at least three different angles:
2 e.g. to test the reliability of a new index for use in paramet-
ric insurance products, no single policy has to be sold, as correla-
tion between the index and actual yield can be assessed outside 
an insurance contract.
3 As opposed to risk aggregators or local and national govern-
ments. Sometimes, this is also called the micro-level, while risk 
aggregators would be called meso-level and governments the 
macro-level.
I  Comprehensive risk management: preven-
tion, adaptation, mitigation and transfer of risk. 
ACI as part of the risk transfer mechanisms with-
in the broader risk management approach.
II  Insurance market development: developing 
efficient	insurance	markets	as	part	of	a	financial	
sector deepening strategy, laying the foundation 
for future developments.
III  Social protection: ACI as one component in ex-
tending social protection to rural populations.
Risk is one of the central themes in farming, 
weather often playing a dominant role, especially 
for smallholder farmers who engage in most cases 
in rain-fed agriculture. Depending on the farming 
activity	and	location,	pests	and	disease,	bush	fires,	
trampling	 by	 large	 animals,	 price	 fluctuations	 on	
the world markets and other events may add sig-
nificantly	 to	 the	 level	 of	 uncertainty	 under	which	
smallholder farmers have to make investment deci-
sions and ultimately survive. While returns on farm 
inputs can be substantial in good years, a number 
of constraints prevent smallholder farmers from 
realizing the full potential from their farming ac-
tivities. In consequence, ACI projects should enable 
smallholder farmers to better manage their pro-
duction risks.
Part of the risk smallholder farmers face could be 
insured. Insurance, and especially agricultural mi-
croinsurance, can positively impact rural communi-
ties in two distinct ways by:
 • providing protection against set-backs due 
to crop losses or lost livestock and hence help 
farmers to get back on their feet as fast as pos-
sible when struck by a natural calamity. If insur-
ance payouts swiftly reach those who suffered, it 
can help smoothing consumption as well as pre-
venting the sale of productive assets and other 
negative coping strategies.
 • enabling farmers to engage in more risky, 
but on average more lucrative farm activi-
ties, such as alternative or new crops, extended 
surface cultivated, the increased use of fertilizer 
and pesticides, or irrigation. In other words, ag-
ricultural insurance can lead to (intended) behav-
ioural change4.
Natural catastrophes affect all people in a given 
area, but low-income households are often even 
more exposed as they usually live and work in ar-
eas that are more vulnerable to natural calamities. 
Insurance against natural calamities usually meets 
even lower demand from end-clients than agricul-
4 Note that unintended behavioural change – moral hazard – 
is a key concern in all agricultural insurance programmes: insured 
farmers may not care as much about their crops as uninsured 
farmers would.
7tural insurance, as people tend to ignore the poten-
tial consequences of severe but rather infrequent 
events (low-frequency, but high impact events). 
And unlike in agriculture, insurance against natu-
ral disasters is hardly enabling clients to engage in 
more rewarding, but riskier businesses.
Disaster risk management: Insurance is only one 
component of a well-balanced disaster risk man-
agement strategy. Prevention and adaptation is in 
most circumstances more cost effective than insur-
ing unsustainable conditions. However, once dis-
aster risk has been reduced and risk management 
improved, insurance still has value to protect invest-
ments made. There may be a trade off between 
risk reduction and insurance. Generally, enhanced 
risk management allows for lower levels of insur-
ance. And until all these different measures are put 
in place and complement each other, humanitar-
ian aid interventions may be required to quickly 
respond to immediate events. A holistic approach 
to sustainable risk management solutions is thus 
required calling for the right mix of disaster risk re-
duction measures, humanitarian relief approaches, 
and catastrophe insurance solutions.
2.2.2 Essential preconditions for 
successful ACI projects
Agriculture is for many countries a very important 
sector, both from an economic and social perspec-
tive, as large proportions of the population directly 
depend on it. Natural disasters have the poten-
tial to disrupt fragile states in addition to causing 
potentially huge losses in lives and assets. Formal 
insurance services therefore stand in direct com-
petition to ad-hoc activities by various government 
bodies, local and international NGOs, as well as by 
bilateral and multi-lateral organisations. In conse-
quence, insurance projects for smallholder farm-
ers or more generally addressing risks from natural 
catastrophes operate in relatively complex political 
and institutional environments, where a minimum 
of preconditions have to be present in order to give 
ACI projects a fair chance of success.
In	almost	all	cases,	the	following	five	factors	have	
proved to be critical to long-term project success:
 • Receptive policy environment: the success of 
ACI projects is highly dependent on the policy 
framework in place: is it supportive enough to al-
low market-based insurance solutions playing an 
important role? Where public funds and agencies 
are involved, stable and predictable public-private 
development partnerships are essential. Ideally, 
they should not depend on the electoral cycle.
 • Regulatory framework: all insurance activi-
ties must operate within a country’s set of laws 
and regulations. A functioning insurance sector 
that complies with these laws and regulations is 
a precondition to launch an ACI project. Where 
the regulatory framework is not supportive of in-
novative approaches (e.g. parametric insurance 
contracts), the regulator should at least express 
interest	and	flexibility	regarding	future	changes.	
 • Reinsurance: is required to effectively transfer 
peak risk exposure from primary insurers to a 
level	where	it	can	be	handled	through	diversifica-
tion, very often at the international level. As ACI 
projects need to reach scale in order to become 
sustainable, reinsurers should at least express 
some appetite5. In fact, reinsurers typically pro-
vide	not	only	financial	capacity,	but	also	techni-
cal support to primary insurers when developing 
such products as they do the structuring and 
pricing of the ACI products.
 • Historical data: the better available data on 
past events (both on the hazard and loss side), 
the easier is it to calculate an appropriate insur-
ance premium. In the absence of good historical 
data, insurers and reinsurers tend to add hefty 
‘security margins’. The availability of data will to 
a large extent dictate product design options.
 • Distribution network:	 efficient	 and	 low-cost	
distribution has proven to be a key bottleneck far 
beyond ACI. For agricultural insurance, farmer 
organisations, out-grower schemes, input suppli-
ers and rural lenders may play a key role. Both 
high client value of proposed ACI products and 
well-aligned interest and incentives for all in-
volved partners are critical to success. Projects 
without a clear distribution strategy are unlikely 
to succeed.
Depending	on	the	specific	context,	the	following	as-
pects may be important to a greater or lesser extent:
 • Disincentive through generous ex-post in-
terventions: where individuals and companies 
can count on aid in the wake of natural disasters, 
the incentives to invest in ex-ante instruments 
–	 such	as	 insurance	–	are	 significantly	 reduced.	
For local and central governments, the tempta-
tion to promised support may often be high, but 
they have to be aware of the antagonistic effect 
on formal insurance market development. How-
ever,	in	the	absence	of	any	significant	coverage	
through insurance, ex-post interventions are still 
needed in order to avoid humanitarian crises. 
Consequently, a transparent communication and 
gradual shift towards ex-ante mechanisms is re-
quired.
5 While the number of reinsurance companies is large, those 
engaged in agricultural insurance is relatively limited. If a specific 
company expresses no appetite for a given project this may 
simply mean that this company has other priorities, but not 
necessarily that the project has little chances of success in itself. 
Likewise,	expressed	reinsurance	support	does	not	indicate	that	
the project will truly benefit the target population, as reinsurers 
are primarily profit driven.
8 • Interest and buy-in from primary insurers: 
primary insurance companies may shy away from 
engaging in new, untested products that expose 
them	 to	 potentially	 significant	 risks.	 They	 may	
be willing to participate in a project, but not to 
fully	 integrating	 it	 into	their	core	business.	Low	
levels of interest from primary insurers can partly 
be balanced by a stronger involvement of inter-
national reinsurance companies. However, this 
is likely to increase overall costs. Nevertheless, a 
substantial part – often more than 50% of total 
risks – needs to be transferred to the interna-
tional	re-insurance	market	for	risk	diversification	
purposes of primary insurers and for mitigat-
ing potential losses to be borne by government 
budgets.
 • Market pool: typically, primary insurance com-
panies	 do	 not	 have	 the	 required	 financial	 and	
human resources to implement and sustain ag-
ricultural or catastrophe insurance on their own. 
The creation of a market pool with uniform prod-
ucts may allow the development and retention of 
such business on a larger scale than if left to in-
dividual insurers. The downside of this approach 
is that innovation and competition is likely to be 
relatively low.
 • Subsidies: in many countries, subsidies for agri-
cultural insurance have a long and volatile histo-
ry. While they clearly help to reach scale quickly, 
they may also disrupt the market, if found too 
expensive, and cut back on short notice (see dis-
cussion on smart subsidies below).
 • Rural lending and input supply: ACI prod-
ucts are often expected to catalyse rural lend-
ing and boost demand for higher value inputs 
such as seeds and fertilizer. Experience so far has 
revealed that these services should ideally exist 
already and work properly before ACI products 
are introduced. If these services are not available, 
they will need to be developed as part of – or in 
conjunction with – the ACI project.
2.2.3 Smart subsidies in agriculture6
The overwhelming majority of OECD countries sup-
port their farmers through subsidized agricultural 
insurance7. However, for most developing coun-
tries,	securing	adequate	resources	for	financing	ag-
ricultural subsidies over time has proven extremely 
challenging.
6 This chapter draws upon a paper commissioned by the Gates 
Microinsurance Innovation Facility (to be published) as well as 
upon the SDC Note entitled “Development Aid and Subsidies 
– An Art”, 2007, accessible under http://www.sdc-employment-
income.ch/en/Home/Making_Markets_Work_for_the_Poor/
Resources_on_the_M4P_approach?page=3&action=search&sear
chCategory=4440&searchCategory=4440.
7 See for example: Olivier Mahul and Charles Stutley (2010): 
Government Support to Agricultural Insurance. World Bank.
Main reasons for subsidising ACI include:
 • Equity concerns: where insurance premiums 
are high, large proportions of the population 
may be excluded from these services. Yet, espe-
cially smallholders stand to see substantial wel-
fare improvements through better protection 
against severe setbacks.
 • Food security: once farmers are insured, they 
may be more inclined to invest in their farming 
business, raising total output. In addition, agri-
cultural	 lenders	may	 be	willing	 to	 finance	 such	
investments only if harvests are insured.
 • First-mover disadvantage: in order to develop 
and test new insurance products, substantial 
investments in data collection, infrastructure, 
product design and building public-private part-
nership development have to be made. Private 
insurers	may	find	 the	potential	 returns	 too	 low	
for heavy up-front investments and hence ne-
glect ACI as business lines.
 • Externalities:	raising	awareness	on	the	benefits	
of	 insurance	will	 benefit	 the	whole	 sector,	 not	
just the sector in which ACI is offered. Invest-
ments in data generation (e.g. harvest, weather) 
may lead to public goods – if made publically ac-
cessible – that can be used by competitors. And 
once a product is successfully introduced, com-
petitors	may	find	it	easier	to	improve	upon	it.
In	consequence,	smart	subsidies	may	be	defined	as	
subsidies that are put in place with a clearly stated 
goal in mind, targeting those people or companies 
contributing most to achieving the goal and admin-
istered	in	the	most	cost-efficient	way.	Smart	subsi-
dies will include a clear exit strategy or rely on se-
cured,	long-term	financing	where	required.	Results	
have to be continuously monitored and evaluated. 
A	subsidy	that	may	be	smart	within	today´s	financial	
sector context may turn ´non-smart´ with a chang-
ing sector context in even the near future. There is, 
therefore, a thin line between subsidising the mar-
ket	entrance	of	the	´first	mover´	insurance	company	
without cementing its monopolistic position.
The following risks need to be considered when de-
ciding on smart subsidies:
 • Inefficient spending: there may be more cost-
effective alternatives compared to subsidies in 
achieving the stated development objective of 
ACI projects.
 • Sustainability: subsidies to agricultural insur-
ance can quickly become too costly to most gov-
ernments in emerging economies. 
 • Targeting subsidies to those that need it most is 
invariably	difficult.	Either	subsidies	reach	also	sub-
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it or costs to run the scheme become very high. A 
solution may be indirect targeting by limiting the 
insurance coverage to the needs of low-income 
households (e.g. size of arable land insured).
 • All subsidies will attract rent-seeking: where sub-
sidies	are	available	for	a	specific	group	of	clients	
or	for	specific	activities,	individuals	and	companies	
will	always	try	to	profit	from	them	even	if	they	are	
not intended to be among the target group.
 • Subsidies may lead to perverse incentives: if 
the insurance premium paid by clients is lower 
than the risk premium, individuals have an incen-
tive to extend their business and buy as much 
insurance as possible, as they will be positioned 
to gain in any case.
Many smallholder farmers may contend that they 
are too poor to afford ACI products. While income 
restrictions can be overcome by subsidies, the 
risk-sharing principles of insurance should remain 
in place: sharing the fortunes of the many with 
the few struck by misfortunes. Otherwise, such 
schemes become conditional cash transfers.
2.2.4 Sustainability of agricultural 
and catastrophe insurance projects
In general, people tend to underestimate the im-
pact of low-frequency/high-severity events, which 
may partly explain the low levels of demand for 
insurance products that provide protection against 
such events. In addition, ACI products tend to be 
relatively costly. Unlike other microinsurance prod-
ucts, ACI is often rather technical and usually in-
volves many partners in the insurance service chain. 
This	 adds	 to	 the	 relatively	 high	 fix	 costs.	ACI	 per	
unit cost is invariably unattractive in schemes that 
reach a few 10’000 clients only. As a direct con-
sequence, aiming at scale is critical for long-term 
sustainability. Scale in ACI can be secured by:
 • Building scalable systems right from the be-
ginning: while pilot schemes are often required 
to test a product, care should be taken to create 
scalable pilots. Scaling pilots could for example 
be restricted by the availability of critical infra-
structure, data or distribution mechanisms.
 • Providing cover at the meso-level: insuring risk-
aggregators instead of individuals has many advan-
tages,	including	targeted	marketing	and	education;	
fewer transactions but with better educated part-
ners;	and	additional	design	options	which	may	pro-
vide better value to customers. Of course care has 
to	be	taken	to	ensure	that	benefits	reach	down	to	
the end clients, either directly or indirectly.
 • Subsidies: smart subsidies are likely to help 
reaching scale quickly, though sustainability of 
subsidies may be an issue (see above).
 • Public-Private Development Partnerships: 
Effective public-private development partner-
ships are essential for developing sustainable 
ACI markets. The government thereby plays a 
key role in creating an enabling legislative and 
regulative framework for ACI to evolve. It may 
also be instrumental in reaching the necessary 
scale to kick-start ACI operations by subsidising 
premiums or by increasing directly the demand 
for ACI as new instrument of its national disaster 
risk management system. The public sector also 
needs	 to	step	 in	with	financial	education	being	
a public good. All of this is needed for the do-
mestic private insurance sector to engage, as it 
is	underdeveloped	and	highly	inefficient	in	many	
developing economies and thus not in a positive 
to	come	up	with	the	significant	up-front	invest-
ment costs on its own.
2.2.5 Complementary or alterna-
tive approaches to realize devel-
opment objectives
Insurance – a means to an end: Insurance is a 
tool to manage risk and thus can contribute to 
enhanced resilience of local communities towards 
natural disasters, to income and employment gen-
eration, and ultimately reduced poverty levels. 
What matters are the results of being insured – 
rather than the fact of being insured – while com-
paring these results with other alternatives to reach 
the same objectives. It is important to be clear 
about these alternatives, their degree of complex-
ity,	risks	and	the	cost-benefit	ratio	in	order	to	make	
an informed decision. More often than not, these 
additional options are not alternatives in a strict 
sense, but rather valuable components of a more 
holistic risk management approach. The two lists 
below discuss some of these potential interventions 
in	the	field	of	agriculture/food	security,	as	well	as	in	
natural disasters more generally.
Agriculture/food security: In this area, rural liveli-
hoods can be strengthened and smallholder farm-
ers can be supported in many ways, including by:
 • Promoting and supporting farmer organisa-
tions. Organizing farmers in co-operatives has 
many advantages, ranging from a better nego-
tiating position and bargaining power (for buy-
ing inputs or marketing produce), being heard by 
local or national government, becoming a more 
interesting partner for extension or other services 
etc. From an insurance perspective, farmers are 
becoming more interesting, if they are organised. 
Insuring pre-existing groups reduces transaction 
costs and adverse selection and it opens the way 
to new product designs and combinations of 
services (e.g. savings), which potentially allows 
insurance to play its appropriate role: providing 
protection against infrequent events with huge 
impacts: the catastrophic losses.
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 • Promoting good agricultural practise through ex-
tension services. In many developing countries, 
smallholder farmers are not well trained and could 
significantly	increase	their	income	while	maintain-
ing or even improving soil fertility, if better farm-
ing techniques were applied. As a consequence, 
the provision of well-structured extension services 
may have a tremendous impact and prepare the 
ground for insurance to play its proper role.
 •  Providing farmers with market information. If 
smallholder farmers have access to several mar-
kets, providing them with price information can 
make a notable difference and allow them to ar-
bitrage. As a result of rapidly increased mobile 
phone coverage, such services can be provided 
at low cost on a wide scale.
 • Reducing post harvest losses and increasing earn-
ings through the provision of storage facilities. 
Smallholder communities often have inadequate 
access to good storage facilities. In the absence of 
such infrastructure they are forced to sell imme-
diately after harvest (often at a lower price) or see 
their harvest diminished by post-harvest losses.
 • Strengthening the smallholder farmers’ position 
within the respective value chains, promoting ac-
cess	to	adequate	financing	methods	in	the	value	
chain and encouraging participation in contract 
farming schemes.
Natural	catastrophes:	in	this	field,	some	approach-
es to reduce negative impacts include:
 • Promoting risk awareness and offering simple 
protection mechanisms. For example, traders 
could protect their goods by wrapping in plastic 
or	elevating	them	from	the	floor	so	that	goods	are	
less	likely	to	get	damaged	in	the	event	of	a	flood.	
Damage to buildings through heavy rains can be 
reduced if small leakages in the roofs are repaired.
 • Protecting villages and larger areas through ap-
propriate investments in infrastructure, such as 
dams or well-kept drainage systems.
 • Attenuating	floods	and	landslides	by	large-scale	
afforestation efforts.
 • Saving human lives through the construction of 
decentralized disaster refuge centres and ear-
ly warning systems for risks such as tsunamis 
and	floods.
All these approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
On the contrary, they often present opportunities 
for	 substantial	 synergetic	gains.	Cost-benefit	con-
siderations should be part of the decision-making 
process when prioritizing and sequencing risk miti-
gation interventions. Risk carriers and their clients 
will	find	it	significantly	less	expensive	to	engage	in	
insurance once the overall level of risk is reduced 
through prevention and adaptation.
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Depending on the development objectives identi-
fied	(see	above),	the	definitions	of	project	success	
will vary widely. If the project is aimed at deepen-
ing	the	financial	sector	through	the	promotion	of	
insurance, then the number of companies active, 
premium written etc. will be informative. When 
improved agricultural risk management is the main 
focus, then the overall productivity and resilience 
of the agricultural sector will need to be monitored 
and assessed. If the provision of social safety nets 
for rural households is the key goal, then the re-
sponse activities in case of major calamities and 
long-term impact will need to be reviewed.
From a customer perspective, potential outcomes 
linked to ACI may therefore include:
 • Consumption smoothing: one of the core 
goals of insurance is to smooth consump-
tion: in ´good´ years disposable income is 
a bit lower than compared to an uninsured 
status (as premiums have to be paid), but in 
´bad´ years consumption can be maintained 
at an acceptable level thanks to claims pay-
ments.
 • Better credit terms and conditions: insured 
clients are better clients for a lending insti-
tution, as their default risk is significantly 
lower. This should translate into better 
terms and conditions for insured clients, e.g. 
reduced interest rate and even allow the 
lender to extend credit to people considered 
too risky in the absence of insurance.
 • Increased investment and income: insur-
ance may enable individuals to develop new 
business opportunities that more than com-
pensate for the expense of insurance.
From an insurance sector perspective, potential 
outcomes may include:
 • Sustainability: financial sustainability is a 
key indicator of all insurance products. Ex-
perience has shown that break-even points 
for ACI products can rarely be achieved in 
less than 5 years of operation. Where sub-
sidies are involved, the focus should be on 
economic sustainability and efficiency of 
funds used.
 • Increased demand for insurance services: 
over time, clients should become more fa-
miliar with the concept of insurance and 
acknowledge its value. This should lead to 
increased demand and ultimately to addi-
tional insurance services.
Individual insurers typically measure their busi-
ness success in terms of:
a) Number of insured households, properties  
 and area under cultivation
b) Total sum insured
c) Gross premium written
d)	 Profit	margin
e)	 Loss	ratio8
f) Expense ratio
In addition to the above performance indicators, 
the microinsurance sector has developed a set of 
key indicators9. These indicators provide valuable 
measures	 for	 the	 efficiency	 and	 value	 proposi-
tion of individual products from a given company. 
However, in the case of ACI, development partners 
typically aim at more: transforming the ways rural 
8 Calculating a sensible loss ratio is difficult, as ACI is by 
definition highly volatile: a row of years with little to no losses 
may be followed by a catastrophic loss, wiping out reserves. 
As a consequence, the anticipated loss ratio and management 
expenses are better indicators.
9 John Wipf and Denis Garand (2010): Performance Indicators 
for Microinsurance. ADA, BRS and MiN
3	 Definition	of	success	and	outcome	monitoring
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communities deal with risk and, once better risk 
management tools are available, how they change 
agricultural production. To capture this, addition-
al indicators are required than those mentioned 
above.
Generally, not enough effort has gone into moni-
toring and evaluation of ACI for low-income popu-
lations, as noted in several recent publications10. 
One critical aspect that is rarely looked at is whether 
ACI project have had any unintended negative out-
comes – i.e., whether they do no harm! Develop-
ing and promoting insurance products is often seen 
as relatively safe in the sense that there is a low 
risk of doing harm. Clients are highly unlikely to 
10 E.g. World Bank (2011), GlobalAgRisk (2011)
get into deep trouble because they buy too much 
insurance (unlike offering credit). At the same time, 
many insurance products offer relatively poor value 
to clients. If so, clients face opportunity costs (they 
could use the money spent on premium on other, 
more valuable, goods or services). In addition, poor 
value products contribute to the negative percep-
tion of insurance in general and hence impact the 
prospects for selling better products in the future. 
Lastly,	ACI	products	can	put	the	insurer	and	some-
times even aggregators at risk, if accumulation or 
basis risk is not properly managed. For that reason, 
great	care	should	be	taken	to	clearly	limit	the	finan-
cial risk to involved partners, either through reinsur-
ance or contractual limits.
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The following questions are grouped along the 
sub-sections of this paper.
4.1 Questions related to 
Rationale for supporting ACI 
projects
 • What is the primary motivation for the pro-
posed ACI project?
 › a. Offering better risk coping and manage-
ment services to target clients?
 › b. Promoting income and employment, such 
as promoting agricultural/rural value chains, deep-
ening the domestic financial sector through sup-
porting the development of an ACI market, etc?
 › c. Social protection (or humanitarian aid) 
objectives, such as strengthening the resilience 
of local communities against natural disasters, 
increased food security, etc?
 • Are the risks targeted by ACI a key concern to all 
project stakeholders?
 › If yes, what is likely to change once ACI is in place?
 › If no, what are the prospects that ACI will still 
have a significant development contribution?
4.2 Questions related to 
essential preconditions for 
successful ACI projects
Are the following essential preconditions met?
 • Receptive policy environment, that accommodates 
and supports market-based risk management tools.
 • Regulatory framework, which is expressed in a func-
tioning insurance market and that provides enough 
flexibility	to	introduce	innovative	insurance	services.
 • Insurance and reinsurance committed capacity 
or at least expressed appetite.
 • Historical data: availability of quality data sets, 
spanning several decades.
 • Distribution network:	 efficient	 and	 low-cost	
distribution strategy, where all partners have 
well-aligned interests and incentives.
Which of the following aspects may become relevant?
 • Disincentive through ex-post interventions: 
how did local and central governments and/
or third parties react in previous cases of large 
disasters? Will post-disaster relief activities work 
against the intended insurance project?
 • Interest and buy-in from primary insurers: 
are primary insurance companies seriously inter-
ested in developing and selling new ACI prod-
ucts? Do they have enough capital to retain 
meaningful portions of the business?
 • Market pool: what are the prospects of creating 
a market pool for ACI services?
 • Subsidies: are subsidies likely? If yes, are they 
reasonably secured over the next decade?
 • Rural lending and input supply: do these ser-
vices already exist and work properly?
4.3 Questions related to 
Smart Subsidies in Agriculture
 • What are the concrete issues to be addressed 
by the subsidies?
 • What is the cost-benefit ratio of the proposed sub-
sidies – and how does it compare to alternatives?
 • What is the time horizon for the planned sub-
sidy? What is the exit strategy?
 • How secure are subsidies over the time period 
they are proposed?
 • What would be the impact, if subsidies were 
withdrawn unexpectedly?
4 Key assessment questions
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 • What is the potential to reach several 100.000 
clients within the project term?
 • Are there concrete prospects to insure risk ag-
gregators, such as producer cooperatives, rural 
lenders, input suppliers etc?
 • Are new approaches tested in a controlled pilot? 
If no pilot is proposed, what are the reasons to 
skip that step?
 • Will the project be sustainable when donors 
withdraw their support?
 • Is ACI embedded into a broader intervention 
strategy?
 › a. If yes, what are the other, mutually rein-
forcing activities? What should be in place prior 
to launching ACI services?
 › b. If not, on what grounds does the project 
expect to be able achieving a lasting impact?
 • In case of agricultural insurance, the following 
complementary approaches could be considered:
 › a. Strengthening farmer organisations
 › b. Providing or improving extension services
 › c. Providing easy and low-cost access to 
market information
 › d. Improve quality storage facilities for 
smallholder farmers
 • In case of catastrophe insurance, the following 
complementary approaches could be considered:
 › a. Training people in preventive and miti-
gating measures
 › b. Investment in preventive infrastructure
 › c. Encouraging afforestation
 › d. Build early warning systems and disaster 
shelters for at-risk populations
4.6 Questions related to Definition of success and outcome 
monitoring
 • Through which mechanisms should the proposed ACI product help the target population?
Proposed key mechanism Agriculture Catastrophe
I  Peace of mind and higher quality of life: insured customers have 
one important issue less to worry about and can better plan  
II	 	Insurance	pay-outs	after	an	event	are	disbursed	in	a	sufficiently	
timely manner to enable clients to immediately restart their  
businesses after an event
 
III  ACI facilitates access to other services for which clients typically 
have	a	high	demand	(e.g.	input	credits);	or	terms	of	such	 
services are better, if the client is insured.
 
IV  Removing important parts of the risks clients typically face  
allows them to invest more into their business and/or engage in 
more lucrative, but more volatile businesses

 • What is expected to change once the ACI is in 
place? Some examples include:
 › a.	 Lending	institutions	consider	insured	
clients as more creditworthy and are willing to 
extend more credit (for farm inputs or general 
business) to them. Alternatively, insured clients 
are able to access credit on better conditions 
compared with uninsured clients. As clients 
make use of a better or additional offer, their 
average income and net earnings increase and 
consumption is smoother.
 › b.	 Lending	institutions	can	reduce	the	risks	
of their agricultural loan exposure and can thus 
growth their loan portfolio allowing them to 
serve population segments, business activities 
and geographic areas which otherwise would 
be too risky for them. As a result, their new 
and existing clients benefit through accessing 
these services.
 › c. Clients change their business practises 
and engage in more rewarding, but riskier 
activities (e.g. high-yield seeds, more fertilizer, 
other crops, etc). This translates into increased 
average income and growing employment.
4.4 Questions related to Sustainability in ACI projects
4.5 Questions related to Complementary approaches
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